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“When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 
‘it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.” 
-Alice in Wonderland 
 
The UN Security Council is making increasing use of its Chapter VII 
powers to authorize peacekeeping missions to protect civilians (POC) 
against threats to their right to life or physical integrity. This is of both 
normative and practical significance and is transforming “traditional” 
notions of peacekeeping. For protection to be effective, there must be a 
common understanding who should be protected, from what, by whom 
and until when. However, the term is also used in a number of other 
senses whose vagueness and elasticity diminishes their practical utility. 
Confusing the notion of protection of civilians—which is firmly rooted in 
international humanitarian and human rights law—with the political 
“responsibility to protect” (R2P) doctrine risks undermining the 
practical protection that UN peacekeeping missions should provide.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
There are now around 100,000 UN troops deployed around the world 
on missions who have authority from the Security Council to use force to 
protect civilians.
1
 Armed soldiers are being given lawful permission to 
  
 1. See Surge in Uniformed UN Peacekeeping Personnel from 1991 Present, 
U.N. Peacekeeping Documents, UNITED NATIONS,  
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/chart.pdf (last visited Aug. 2013). 
702 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 23.3 
 
enter into the territory of other states in order to protect people from 
grave violations of international human rights or international 
humanitarian law (IHL). For protection to be effective there must be a 
common understanding of who should be protected, from what, by whom 
and until when. The term “protection” can be found in international 
humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and UN Security Council 
resolutions on POC often refer to all three bodies of law.
2
 However, the 
“protection” that they provide is quite different in both conceptual and 
practical terms and this can lead to confusion about the applicable body 
of law for peacekeeping missions authorized by the Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
The term “protection” is also commonly used by humanitarian aid 
workers to describe certain activities connected to the delivery of relief 
assistance. While notionally based on the above three legal frameworks, 
it is usually taken as referring to monitoring and advocacy work to 
ensure that assistance reaches its intended recipients, that their 
beneficiaries provide adequate physical protection and to “bear witness” 
to violations of fundamental rights. Finally, the term is also often 
associated with the concept of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) 
doctrine, whose proponents often describe it as “an emerging 
international norm,” by which the “international community” may 
occasionally substitute itself for the protection that States are expected to 
provide those within their jurisdiction. This article provides a brief 
overview of how these different terms are generally understood, their 
inter-relationship and potential normative significance. 
I. PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS MANDATES 
On 12 February 1999 the UN Security Council, under a Canadian 
Presidency, held an open meeting on the matter of protection of civilians 
  
 2. S.C. Res. 1265, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1265 (Sep. 17, 1999). This was the 
first resolution on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (POC) adopted by the UN 
Security Council and referred to the need for UN personnel “involved in peace-making, 
peacekeeping and peace-building activities have appropriate training in international 
humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.” Id. 




 The Council noted with concern that civilians and 
humanitarian aid workers “continued to be targeted in instances of armed 
conflict, in flagrant violation of international humanitarian and human 
rights law” and requested that the Secretary General submit “a report 
with recommendations on how it could act to improve both the physical 
and legal protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict.”4 A 
Presidential statement following the meeting noted that:  
Bearing in mind its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, the Council affirms the need for the 
international community to assist and protect civilian populations 
affected by armed conflict. . . . The Council expresses its willingness to 
respond, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to 
situations in which civilians, as such, have been targeted or 
humanitarian assistance to civilians has been deliberately obstructed.
5
 
The report was published in September 1999 and contained a series of 
recommendations on how the Security Council could “compel parties to 
conflict to respect the rights guaranteed to civilians by international law 
and convention.”6 In welcoming its publication, the Security Council 
  
 3. S.C. Pres. Statement 1999/6, S/PRST/1999/6 (Feb. 12, 1999). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security 
Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. S/1999/957 (Sept. 8, 
1999); see also U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security 
Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. S/2001/331 (Mar. 
30, 2001); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security 
Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. S/2004/431 (May 
28, 2004); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security 
Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. S/2005/740 (Nov. 
28, 2005); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security 
Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. S/2007/643 (Oct. 28, 
2007); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council 
on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. S/2007/643 (Oct. 28, 2007); 
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. S/2009/277 (May 29, 2009); U.N. 
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. S/2010/579 (Nov. 11, 2010); U.N. 
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adopted the first in a series of resolutions on the Protection of Civilians 
in Armed Conflict.
7
 This resolution noted, in its preamble, the “primary 
responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the 
maintenance of international peace and security,” the “importance of 
taking measures aimed at conflict prevention and resolution” and the 
“need to address the causes of armed conflict in a comprehensive manner 
in order to enhance the protection of civilians on a long-term basis, 
including by promoting economic growth, poverty eradication, 
sustainable development, national reconciliation, good governance, 
democracy, the rule of law and respect for and protection of human 
rights.”8 It underlined “the importance of safe and unhindered access of 
humanitarian personnel to civilians in armed conflict, including refugees 
and internally displaced persons, and the protection of humanitarian 
assistance to them” and emphasized “the need for combatants to ensure 
the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and 
associated personnel, as well as personnel of international humanitarian 
organizations.”9 
More specifically the resolution also expressed its “willingness to 
consider how peacekeeping mandates might better address the negative 
  
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. S/2012/376 (May 22, 2012); U.N. 
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. S/2013/689 (Nov. 22, 2013). 
 7. See generally Sec. Res. 1265, supra note 2; see also S.C. Res. 1296, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1296 (Apr. 19, 2000); S.C. Res. 1502, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1502 (Aug. 26, 
2003); S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006); S.C. Res. 1894, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009) (on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, which 
reaffirm, inter alia, the relevant provisions of the United Nations World Summit outcome 
document); S.C. Res. 1612, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1612 (Jul. 26, 2005); S.C. Res. 1882, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1882 (Aug. 4, 2009); S.C. Res. 1998, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1998 (Jul. 12, 2011); 
S.C. Res. 2068, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2068 (Sept. 19, 2012); S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000); S.C. Res. 1820, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008); 
S.C. Res. 1888, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1888 (Sep. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1889, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1889 (Oct. 5, 2009); S.C. Res. 1960, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1960 (Nov. 11, 2009); 
S.C. Res. 1960, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1960 (Dec. 16, 2010) (on women, peace and security). 
 8. Sec. Res. 1265, supra note 2, at pmbl. 
 9. Id. ¶¶ 7, 8.  
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impact of armed conflict on civilians”10 and requested the Secretary-
General “to ensure that United Nations personnel involved in 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building activities have 
appropriate training in international humanitarian, human rights and 
refugee law.”11 The following month the Security Council authorized a 
peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, which stated that: 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides 
that in the discharge of its mandate UNAMSIL may take the necessary 
action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel 
and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford 
protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence 




The decision to mandate UN forces to use force to protect civilians 
arose in response to a series of crises during the 1990s, which placed the 
“traditional principles” of peacekeeping under increasing strain. Chapter 
VII mandates have been subsequently developed in other peacekeeping 
missions that have forced a significant re-thinking about the protection of 
civilians by these missions under international law.  
The debate in the Security Council that led to the UNAMSIL 
resolution being adopted was notable for the emphasis that was placed on 
the “protection provisions” of international law.13 It was opened by the 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Children and 
Armed Conflict who detailed the atrocities committed against children 
by rebel groups in Sierra Leone.
14
 He was followed by the representative 
of the government of Sierra Leone who noted that the previous United 
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) “was not 
equipped to deal with certain situations” in the country and stated that: 
  
 10. Id. ¶ 11.  
 11. Id. ¶ 14.  
 12. S.C. Res. 1270, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999).  
 13. See U.N. SCOR, 53 Sess., 4054 Mtg., U.N Doc. S/PV.4054 (Oct. 22, 1999), 
at 1 - 18 
 14. See id. at 2-5.  
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This is why the Sierra Leone delegation could not help but highlight 
paragraph 14 of the draft resolution, which says that acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, the new United Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone, in discharge of its mandate, may take the necessary measures to 
ensure the safety and freedom of movement of United Nations 
personnel and, circumstances permitting, to afford protection to 
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. In the view of my 
delegation, whatever interpretation others may give to this particular 
paragraph, we regard it as an insurance policy for both international 
peacekeepers and innocent civilians.
15
 
The representative also stressed the positive role played by Nigeria, 
which had led an earlier regional intervention in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone
16
 and a representative of Nigeria was specially invited to address 
the Security Council.
17
 Russia chaired the debate, so it did not express a 
view on the resolution, but the other four permanent members of the 
Security Council all spoke in favour of it, along with Malaysia, Gambia, 
the Netherlands, Brazil, Argentina, Canada and Bahrain.
18
 This 
represented an extremely broad range of support for what was 
understood at the time to be a significant policy development within the 
UN.
19
 China’s representative spoke of the “many rounds of 
consultations” that had gone into agreeing a draft that “accommodates 
the requests of the Government of Sierra Leone and the African members 
and reflects the concerns of other Council members.”20 Argentina 
described the resolution as introducing “a new, fundamental political, 
legal and moral dimension” to peacekeeping, which “shows that the 
Council has learned from its own experience and that it will not remain 
  
 15. Id. at 6.  
 16. Id. at 6. 
 17. Id. at 7-8. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Malaysia, Brazil and Argentina are all leading members of the non-aligned 
movement who, along with Russia and China, have traditionally taken a sceptical or 
hostile position towards “humanitarian interventions.” For further discussion see 
Christine Gray, The Use of Force for Humanitarian Purposes (Jan. 14, 2013). Research 
Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law (2013), forthcoming, available at  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2309922 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).  
 20. U.N. SCOR, 4054 Mtg., supra note 13, at 14. 
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indifferent to indiscriminate attacks against the civilian population.”21 
Brazil said that it “augur[ed] well” for creating the conditions for 
“vigorous peacekeeping involvement of the United Nations in other 
conflicts in Africa.”22  
In the same year the UN published two reports on the failure of its 





subsequent resolution in April 2000 also indicated the Council’s 
intention to provide peacekeeping missions with appropriate mandates 
and resources to protect civilians and called on peacekeepers to consider 
the use of “temporary security zones . . . for the protection of civilians 
and the delivery of assistance in situations characterized by the threat of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes against the civilian 
population.”25  
In August 2000 the UN published the Report of the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report).
26
 This acknowledged 
that over the previous decade the organisation had “repeatedly failed to 
meet the challenge” of saving “generations from the scourge of war.”27 It 
contained a series of recommendations designed to remedy problems that 
the UN had encountered in the deployment of its peacekeeping forces 
focussed on strategic direction, decision-making, rapid deployment, 
operational planning and support.
28
 It also stated that UN peacekeepers 
“who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be 
authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United 
Nations principles. However, operations given a broad and explicit 
  
 21. Id. at 16. 
 22. Id. at 15. 
 23. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the 
Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, U.N. Doc. 
S/1999/1257 (Dec. 16, 1999). 
 24. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to 
General assembly Resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica, U.N. Doc. A/54/549 (Nov. 
15, 1999). 
 25. Sec. Res. 1296, supra note 7, ¶ 15. 
 26. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations, U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 1999). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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mandate for civilian protection must be given the specific resources 
needed to carry out that mandate.”29  
The Brahimi report listed the logistical and resources-based 
challenges that the UN faced in deploying peace-keeping troops in 
sufficient time and number and argued that “[t]he Secretariat must tell 
the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, 
when formulating or changing mission mandates.”30 It also noted that 
“[t]here are hundreds of thousands of civilians in current United Nations 
mission areas who are exposed to potential risk of violence, and United 
Nations forces currently deployed could not protect more than a small 
fraction of them even if directed to do so.”31 Nevertheless, it argued that,  
Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out 
their mandate professionally and successfully. This means that United 
Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other 
mission components and the mission’s mandate. Rules of engagement 
should not limit contingents to stroke-for-stroke responses but should 
allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire that is 
directed at United Nations troops or at the people they are charged to 
protect . . . .
32
  
The report also stated that: 
There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces 
should not be asked to undertake, and many places they should not go. 
But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, 
they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and 
violence with the ability and determination to defeat them.
33
 
Since the publication of the Brahimi Report the number of UN 
peacekeeping missions has increased significantly and these are 
  
 29. Id. ¶ 62. 
 30. Id. ¶ 64(d). 
 31. Id. ¶ 63. 
 32. Id. ¶ 49. 
 33. Id. ¶ 1. 




 While the basic principles of 
“traditional peacekeeping”: consent, impartiality, and limited use of force 
continue to be reaffirmed by the UN General Assembly,
35
 missions in the 
field are grappling with how to apply these while confronting situations 
in which civilians face a range of threats.
36
 The Capstone Doctrine, 
published in 2008, for example, lists as a part of the ‘Core Business’ of 
UN peacekeeping the “[creation of] a secure and stable environment 
while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full 
respect for the rule of law and human rights.” 37 It explains that: 
[M]ost multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are 
now mandated by the Security Council to protect civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence. The protection of civilians 
requires concerted and coordinated action among the military, police 
and civilian components of a United Nations peacekeeping operation 
and must be mainstreamed into the planning and conduct of its core 
  
 34. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 249-54 
(Oxford Univ. Press, USA 3d. 2008). See generally ALEX J. BELLAMY, PAUL D. 
WILLIAMS & STUART GRIFFIN, UNDERSTANDING PEACEKEEPING (Polity Press, 2d ed. 
2010); SIOBHÁN WILLS, PROTECTING CIVILIANS: THE OBLIGATIONS OF PEACEKEEPERS 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2009); UNITED NATIONS REFORM AND THE NEW COLLECTIVE 
SECURITY (Peter G. Danchin and Horst Fischer eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010); 
ELIZABETH G. FERRIS, THE POLITICS OF PROTECTION: THE LIMITS OF HUMANITARIAN 
ACTION (The Brookings Inst., 2011); THOMAS G. WEISS, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: 
WAR AND CONFLICT IN THE MODERN WORLD PEACEKEEPING (Polity Press, 2007). 
 35. Through the Annual Reports of the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping 
Operations. 
 36. For the emphasis on the need to adapt to the changing nature of 
peacekeeping, see U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc. 
A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992); U.N. Secretary-General, Supplement to an Agenda 
for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the United Nations, ¶¶ 11-15, U.N. Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1 (Jan. 3, 1995); 
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES 18 (Dep’t of 
Peacekeeping Operations ed., 2008). See also THE NEW HORIZON INITIATIVE: PROGRESS 
REPORT NO. 2 (Dep’t of Peacekeeping Operations ed., 2011); WILLIAM J. DURCH ET AL, 
THE BRAHIMI REPORT AND THE FUTURE OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS (The Henry L. Stimson 
Ctr., 2003). 
 37. UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, 
supra note 36, at 23. 
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activities. United Nations humanitarian agencies and non-governmental 
organization (NGO) partners also undertake a broad range of activities 
in support of the protection of civilians. Close coordination with these 
actors is, therefore, essential.
38
 
POC is also now debated at an open bi-annual session of the Security 
Council and this has resulted in a steady stream of statements, resolutions 
and reports.
39
 The concept of POC has also been repeatedly endorsed by 
the UN General Assembly.
40
 Guidance produced by the UN Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) also specifies that while the protection of 
civilians is primarily the responsibility of the host government and that 
the mission is deployed to assist and build the capacity of the 
government in the fulfillment of this responsibility, “in cases where the 
government is unable or unwilling to fulfill its responsibility, Security 
Council mandates give missions the authority to act independently to 
  
 38. Id. at 24. 
 39. Id. See also Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of 
Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, U.N. Doc. DPKO/DFS (2010); 
DPKO/DFS Lessons Learned Note on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations: Dilemmas, Emerging Practices and Lessons U.N. Doc. DPKO/DFS (2010); 
Protection of Civilian (POC) Resource and Capability Matrix for Implementation of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations with POC mandates, U.N. Doc. DPKO/DFS (Feb. 2012); 
Guidelines for Protection of Civilians for Military Components of UN Peacekeeping 
Missions, UN DPKO, 2010; U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN 
Peacekeeping Operations, U.N. Doc. OCHA (2011); DIANE PAUL & SIMON BAGSHAW, 
PROTECT OR NEGLECT? TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE UNITED NATIONS APPROACH TO THE 
PROTECTION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (Brookings ed., 2004), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2004/11/23humanrights-bagshaw (explaining 
the Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement and the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, November 23, 2004). 
 40. See G.A. Res. 63/280, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/280 (May 20, 2009); Rep. of 
the Special Comm. on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Grp., 63d Sess., Feb.  
23-Mar. 20, 2009, ¶¶ 125-128, U.N. Doc. A/63/19; GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 19  
(2009).  
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protect civilians . . . . [Meaning that] missions are authorized to use force 
against any party, including elements of government forces.”41 
When the Security Council revised the mandate of the UN mission to 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2007 it stated “that the 
protection of civilians must be given priority in decisions about the use 
of available capacity and resources.”42 Security Council mandates have 
become increasingly detailed in spelling out the tasks of UN 
peacekeeping missions. Although most continue to use a similar set of 
formulations regarding the POC-related tasks to those contained within 
the UNAMSIL mandate, there have been some important developments 
in the language used.
43
 In 2008, the Security Council resolution on the 
DRC removed the reference to ‘without prejudice to the responsibility to 
the government’ and mandated the UN mission (MONUC) to: “Ensure 
the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under 
imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating 
from any of the parties engaged in the conflict.”44 In 2014 the word 
“imminent” was removed from the formulation.45 
  
 41. See Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (POC) 
Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations, supra note 39, at 3 (emphasis added). See 
also Draft Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians Strategies in 
UN Peacekeeping Operations, UN DPKO, 2010. 
 42. S.C. Res. 1794, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1794 (Dec. 21, 2007). 
 43. Since October 2008, the Security Council Report has published a series of 
reports on the protection of civilians in armed conflict tracking the issue on the Security 
Council agenda. See U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Security Council, Cross-Cutting Report: 
Protection of Civilians, 2008 No. 2 (Oct. 14, 2008); U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Security 
Council, Cross-Cutting Report: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2009 No. 4 
(Oct. 30, 2009); U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Security Council, Cross-Cutting Report: 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2010 No. 3 (Oct. 29, 2010); U.N. S.C. Rep. of 
the Security Council, Cross-Cutting Report: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 
2011 No. 2 (July 20, 2011); U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Security Council, Cross-Cutting 
Report: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2012 No. 2 (May 31, 2012); U.N. S.C. 
Rep. of the Security Council, Cross-Cutting Report: Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict, 2013 No. 3 (Dec. 20, 2013). 
 44. S.C. Res. 1856, ¶ 3(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1856 (Dec. 22, 2008) (emphasis 
added). 
 45. S.C. Res. 2147, ¶ 4(a)(i), U.N. Doc. S/RES/2147 (Mar. 28, 2014) (“Ensure, 
within its area of operations, effective protection of civilians under threat of physical 
violence, including through active patrolling, paying particular attention to civilians 
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However, there remain considerable ambiguities about how to 
interpret POC mandates. Although the original Secretary General’s 
report of 1999 set out a clear role for UN-mandated troops to provide 
physical protection to civilians, some subsequent reports were more 
ambiguous on this point.
46
 Attempts to turn the concept into doctrine at 
the tactical and operational levels have also been fraught with difficulty.  
In 2009, ten years after the deployment of the first mission with such 
a mandate, an independent review found that, ”the presumed ‘chain’ of 
events to support protection of civilians – from the earliest planning to 
the implementation of mandates by peacekeeping missions in the field is 
[often] broken’47 and made a series of recommendations for how the 
POC mandates could be better operationalized. The following year a 
concept note by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) noted that:  
A number of senior mission leaders, mission personnel and troop and 
police contributors now feel that the absence of a clear, operationally- 
focused and practical concept for protection of civilians by United 
  
gathered in displaced and refugee camps, humanitarian personnel and human rights 
defenders, in the context of violence emerging from any of the parties engaged in the 
conflict, and mitigate the risk to civilians before, during and after any military 
operation.”). 
 46. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. S/2001/331 (Mar. 30, 2001); U.N. 
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1300 (Nov. 26, 2002). Both of these reports focused 
on the humanitarian rights-based concept of protection and failed to even mention the 
role of internationally-mandated forces in protecting civilians against violence. However, 
U.N. Secretary-General, was much clearer in calling for physical protection of refugees 
and IDPs ‘during transit as well as after return’ and from sexual and gender-based 
violence. Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict, U.N. Doc. S/2004/431 (May 28, 2004). See also U.N. Secretary-General, Report 
of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. 
S/2005/740 (Nov. 28, 2005) (which called on peacekeepers to provide physical protection 
to civilians in camps, during population movements, and in their places of origin as well 
as the role of peacekeepers in restoring law and order, ensuring the civilian character of 
IDP camps, and securing humanitarian access).  
 47. VICTORIA HOLT & GLYN TAYLOR, PROTECTING CIVILIANS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 5 (Tania Inowlocki ed., 2009). 
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Nations peacekeeping operations has contributed to the disconnect 
between expectations and resources. . . . In the absence of a common 
UN position on the protection of civilians by UN peacekeeping 
operations, a wide range of views regarding what protection of civilians 
means for UN peacekeeping missions has taken root. Troop and police 
contributors, Member States, the Security Council, bodies of the 
General Assembly, as well as staff within the missions, DPKO and 
DFS, often understand POC in ways that may contradict one another, 
causing friction, misunderstanding and frustration in missions.
48
  
In March 2014, a report by the UN Office of Internal Oversight 
Services noted that peacekeeping missions routinely avoid using force to 
protect civilians who are under attack, intervening in only 20 percent of 
cases and that “force is almost never used to protect civilians under 
attack.”49 It also noted that: “[f]orce was most likely to be used to protect 
civilians when troops were engaged in self-defence or defence of United 
Nations personnel and property. In some cases civilians had congregated 
in or around United Nations bases and the military component had fired 
on combatants to prevent their access to the base.”50 However:  
Interviewees also referred to gaps at the tactical level on the issue of 
how to respond to complex and ambiguous situations that might require 
  
 48. DPKO/DFS Draft Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in 
Peace Operations, supra note 35, ¶¶ 4, 9.  
 49. See Evaluation of the Implementation and Results of Protection of Civilians 
Mandates in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Rep. of the Office of Internal 
Oversight Services, 68th Sess., Mar. 7, 2014, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/68/787 (2014) (“Of the 
507 incidents involving civilians reported in Secretary-General’s reports from 2010 to 
2013, only 101, or 20 per cent, were reported to have attracted an immediate mission 
response. Conversely, missions did not report responding to 406 (80 per cent) of 
incidents where civilians were attacked. The rate of reported response varied across 
missions, reflecting the seriousness of incidents and the availability of early warning, the 
accessibility of incident sites and other factors.” In an annex to the report UNDPKO 
accepted the report’s main conclusions and recommendations but noted that: “The report, 
however, misses an important opportunity to assess the implementation of protection of 
civilians mandates in their full scope. It focuses on a last resort option — the use of force 
— which we should expect and hope will be a rare occurrence where missions have so 
many other tools at their disposal.”). 
 50. Id. ¶ 23.  
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the use of force. . . such as intervening in fighting between two or more 
armed groups when civilian casualties were likely; when armed groups 
were openly visible in communities, committing extortion through fear 
but without physical violence; when the imminence of the threat could 
not be evaluated; when troops were outnumbered; when reinforcements 
were unavailable; when it would be difficult or impossible to reach the 




As Holt and Berkman have noted, “‘protection’ is often vague and 
undefined,. . . . Deploying peacekeepers without either a clear vision of 
how to protect civilians or the means and authority to do so may result in 
a tragic shortfall.” 52 Part of these difficulties is based on confusion over 
the meaning of the term “protection” and the rest of this chapter briefly 
discusses the other “definitions” of the term that are commonly used in 
the humanitarian discourse.  
II. RIGHTS-BASED PROTECTION  
In December 1991, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 
46/182.
53
 This established the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), 
in order to strengthen the coordination of humanitarian emergency 
assistance during emergencies.
54
 It also contained a set of principles 
relating to the distribution of humanitarian assistance.
55
 The resolution 
emphasized respect for “the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national 
unity of States” and that “humanitarian assistance should be provided 
with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of 
an appeal by [that] country.”56 It also stressed that “humanitarian 
  
 51. Id. ¶ 52.  
 52. Victoria K. Holt & Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military 
Preparedness, The Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations, THE HENRY  
L. STIMSON CENTER, Sept. 2006, at 5, 50.  
 53. U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 78th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/182 (Dec. 19, 
1991), an annex was attached to the resolution and the operative paragraphs of this are 
referred to below.  
 54. Id. para 38.  
 55. Id. paras 1-2.  
 56. Id. para 3.  
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assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of 
humanity, neutrality and impartiality.”57 However, it stated that:  
The magnitude and duration of many emergencies may be beyond the 
response capacity of many affected countries. . . . States whose 
populations are in need of humanitarian assistance are called upon to 
facilitate the work of these organizations in implementing humanitarian 
assistance, in particular the supply of food, medicines, shelter and 
health care, for which access to victims is essential.
58
  
The resolution was passed despite concern expressed during the 




In early 1992 three new UN Departments: DPKO, the Department for 
Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department for Humanitarian Affairs 
(later to become OCHA) were created in a major internal restructuring.
60
 
UN Agencies such as the UNHCR, the World Food Programme (WFP) 
and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) also significantly expanded its 
field presence from the start of the 1990s. This means that UN agencies 
are increasingly providing direct protection and assistance to people in 
complex humanitarian emergencies. 
Since the start of the 1990s the Security Council has also passed a 
number of resolutions demanding unimpeded access by international 
humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance.
61
 A series 
  
 57. Id. para 2.  
 58. Id. paras 5-6.  
 59. Francis K. Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of 
Humanitarian Intervention, THE HAGUE: KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL, 1991, at 141.  
 60. See U.N. Secretary-General, Review of the Efficiency of the Administrative 
and Financial Functioning of the United Nations: Restructuring of the Secretariat of the 
Organization: Rep. of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/212, 23, Dec. 1992; 
and U.N. Secretary-General, Review of the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial 
Functioning of the United Nations: Restructuring of the Secretariat of the Organization: 
Rep. of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/48/218 (Dec. 23, 1993). For discussion see 
Richard Kereem Al-Qaq, Managing World Order: United Nations Peace Operations and 
the Security Agenda, London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009, 49-69. 
 61. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 794, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992) (in 
relation to Somalia); S.C. Res. 770, U.N. Doc. S/RES/770 (Aug. 13, 1992); S.C. Res. 
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of UN General Assembly resolutions have expressed similar views.
62
 
The Security Council has also specifically linked the denial of 
humanitarian access with threats to international peace and security with 
a growing body of resolutions on the importance of ensuring that access 
to such assistance is not arbitrarily prevented.
63
 For example, Security 
Council resolution 1502 after the attack on the UN headquarters in 
Baghdad in 2003 urged “all those concerned . . . to allow full unimpeded 
access by humanitarian personnel to all people in need of assistance, and 
  
836, ¶¶ 5, 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (June 1993) (in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina); S.C. 
Res. 1216, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1216 (Dec. 21, 1998) on the crisis in Guinea-Bissau; S.C. 
Res. 1265, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1265 (1999); S.C. Res. 1296, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1296 (Apr. 
19, 2000); S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006); S.C. Res. 1738, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1738 (Dec. 23, 2006), all of which were adopted under the thematic heading 
of Protection of Civilians. See also S.C. Res. 1502, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1502 (Aug. 26, 
2003) (in relation to Iraq).  
 62. See, e.g., G.A. Res., 49/139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/139 (1994); G.A. Res.,  
51/194, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/194 (1996); G.A. Res., 54/233, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/233  
(1999); G.A. Res., 58/114, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/114 (2003); G.A. Res., 59/141, U.N.  
Doc. A/RES/59/141 (2004); G.A. Res., 60/124, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/124 (2005); G.A.  
Res., 61/134, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/134 (2006); G.A. Res., 62/94, U.N. Doc.  
A/RES/62/94 (2007); G.A. Res., 63/141, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/141 (2008); G.A. Res.,  
63/139 U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/139 (2008); G.A. Res., 63/138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/138  
(2008); G.A. Res., 63/137, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/137 (2008); G.A. Res., 63/136, U.N.  
Doc. A/RES/63/136 (2008). Some of these were generic concerning the strengthening of  
coordination of coordination of humanitarian assistance or protection of humanitarian 
personnel, while others concerned specific country situations. The increasing number of 
such resolutions shows its growing importance for the U.N.’s work. See e.g., G.A. Res., 
63/139, ¶¶ 25, 26, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/139 (Mar. 5, 2009) (“calls upon all States and 
parties in complex humanitarian emergencies, in particular in armed conflict and in post-
conflict situations, in countries in which humanitarian personnel are operating, in 
conformity with the relevant provisions of international law and national laws, to 
cooperate fully with the United Nations and other humanitarian agencies and 
organizations and to ensure the safe and unhindered access of humanitarian personnel, as 
well as delivery of supplies and equipment, in order to allow them to efficiently perform 
their task of assisting affected civilian populations, including refugees and internally 
displaced persons”.). It also designates August 19th as World Humanitarian Day in 
memory of the UN staff killed in the bombing of Baghdad in 2003. Id. 
 63. Compilation of United Nations Resolutions on Humanitarian Assistance: 
Selected Resolutions of the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council and Security 
Council Resolutions and Decisions, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
Policy Development and Studies Branch, Policy and Studies Series, OCHA, (2009).  
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to make available, as far as possible, all necessary facilities for their 
operations.”64 
The delivery of humanitarian assistance is increasingly being 
integrated into the POC concept and being linked to protection of UN 
personnel and humanitarian staff in conflict zones.
65
 A UN DPKO 
concept note on POC in 2009 lists “creating conditions conducive to the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance” as a POC task and states that:  
The provision of humanitarian assistance to conflict affected civilians 
has long been viewed by the humanitarian community as at the core of 
protection activity. Missions may be called upon to help create the 
necessary safe and secure environment to assist with the delivery of 
aid, and, in extremis, may be requested to support the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance by military means.
66
 
From the start of the 1990s, UNHCR became the lead UN 
humanitarian agency in a number of complex emergencies and has also 
  
 64. S.C. Res. 1502, supra note 7, ¶ 6. 
 65. The U.N. is also protected by the Safety Convention and the International 
Criminal Court. See The Convention of Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel, Dec. 9, 1994, art. 7 (“1. United Nations and associated personnel, their 
equipment and premises shall not be made the object of attack or of any action that 
prevents them from discharging their mandate. 2. States Parties shall take all appropriate 
measures to ensure the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel. In 
particular, States Parties shall take all appropriate steps to protect United Nations and 
associated personnel who are deployed in their territory from the crimes set out in article 
9. 3. States Parties shall cooperate with the United Nations and other States Parties, as 
appropriate, in the implementation of this Convention, particularly in any case where the 
host State is unable itself to take the required measures”). The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court also makes it a crime to attack “personnel, installations, 
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the 
protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed 
conflict.” United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July, 17 1998, The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, art. 8.2(b), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July, 17 1998). 
 66. Draft DPKO/DFS, supra note 39, ¶ 13. It also noted that: “Police also 
contribute to this activity through the provision of route security or security in 
refugee/IDP camps, as well as public order management during relief item distribution. 
Eleven missions are currently mandated with this task.” Id. 
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taken increasing responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance and 
protection to IDPs in many situations.
67
 The protracted nature of many 
conflicts since then and the increasing preference for “voluntary return” 
as the most desirable long-term solution to refugee crises, means that 
creating the conditions in which refugees can return “in safety and 
dignity” has become an increasingly important part of UNHCR’s work.68 
This has resulted in the agency establishing large-scale protection, 
assistance and monitoring projects in refugee producing countries and 
highlighting steps that might be taken in countries of origin with regard 




UN agencies often convene Protection Working Groups (PWGs) 
during complex emergencies to coordinate protection-related activities.
70
 
In 2005, as part of a wider process of humanitarian reform, the Global 
Protection Cluster (GPC) was established as an “inter-agency forum at 
the global level for standard and policy setting as well as collaboration 
and overall coordination of activities supporting the protection response 
in complex and natural disaster humanitarian emergencies.”71 Many UN 
  
 67. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR’s Role in 
Support of an Enhanced Humanitarian Response to Situations of Internal Displacement: 
Policy Framework and Implementation Strategy, EC/58/SC/CRP.18 (June 4, 2007). 
 68. UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION: INTERNATIONAL  
PROTECTION 4 (1996) (“Voluntary repatriation is usually viewed as the most desirable  
long-term solution by the refugees themselves as well as by the international 
community.”). 
 69. See G.A. Res. 46/106, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/106 (Dec. 16, 1991)  
(mentioning the promotion of solutions to refugee problems through preventive 
measures).  
 70. Protection Working Groups often have sub-clusters dealing with issues such 
as human rights, land and property, children’s rights and women’s rights, which may be 
chaired by other UN agencies such as OHCHR, UN Habitat, UN Women and UNICEF. 
For further discussion see: Phoebe Wynn-Pope, Evolution of Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict, United Nations Security Council, Department of Peacekeeping  
Operations and the humanitarian community, Oxfam Australia, 2013. 
 71. GLOBAL PROTECTION CLUSTER, 
http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
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and NGO aid agencies employ Protection Officers and donors often 
provide specific funding for protection projects.
72
 
At the end of the 1990s, a series of workshops on the protection of 
civilians organised by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), involving in-depth discussion among some 50 humanitarian, 
human rights and academic organisations/institutions. This defined 
“protection” as:  
[A]ll activities, aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the 
individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant 
bodies of law (i.e. human rights, humanitarian and refugee law). 
Human rights and humanitarian actors shall conduct these activities 
impartially and not on the basis of race, national, national or ethnic 
origin, language or gender.
 73
  
This is sometimes referred to as the “rights-based” definition of 
protection.
74
 Its all-encompassing description is intended to emphasize 
that humanitarian actors have responsibilities to ensure that their work 
does not harm those that they are trying to help.
75
 It clearly obliges them 
to remain impartial and not to discriminate.
76
 However, its normative 
significance beyond this is less clear and humanitarian agencies 




 72. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION: DG ECHO’S 
FUNDING GUIDELINES (Apr. 2009). 
 73. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, STRENGTHENING 
PROTECTION IN WAR: A SEARCH FOR PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (2001). 
 74. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, PROFESSIONAL 
STANDARDS FOR PROTECTION WORK CARRIED OUT BY HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS ACTORS IN ARMED CONFLICT AND OTHER SITUATIONS OF VIOLENCE (2009); 
INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE, GROWING THE SHELTERING TREE: PROTECTING 
RIGHTS THROUGH HUMANITARIAN ACTION (2002); GLOBAL PROTECTION CLUSTER 
WORKING GROUP, HANDBOOK FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 
(2007); SOPHIA SWITHERN & RACHEL HASTIE, IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF CIVILIANS: A 
PROTECTION TRAINING PACK (Oxfam GB ed., 2008). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
 77. See, e.g., SARA PANTULIANO & SORCHA O’CALLAGHAN, THE ‘PROTECTION 
CRISIS’: A REVIEW OF FIELD-BASED STRATEGIES FOR HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION IN 
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The Sphere Handbook, for example, which was developed as part of a 
multi-agency initiative to develop a set of universal minimum standards 
in core areas of humanitarian response,
78
 states that, “those affected by a 
disaster have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to 
assistance.”79 In 2000 it published the first version of a “Humanitarian 
Charter,” which “defines the legal responsibilities of states and parties to 
guarantee the right to assistance and protection.”80 This stated that: When 
states are unable to respond “they are obliged to allow [the intervention 
of] humanitarian organizations . . . .”81 However, this claim was dropped 
from subsequent revised editions, to be replaced by a statement that 
emphasised the “moral principle of humanity” and that interventions will 
normally take place “at the request of or at least with the consent of the 
government of the state in question.”82  
In practice, humanitarian agencies often use the term “protection” in 
four different ways. It is used in the above sense that people have the 
“right” to receive humanitarian aid.83 It is also used to describe the 
monitoring and evaluation of the delivery of this aid to ensure that it 
reaches its intended recipients and does not cause unforeseen negative 
  
DARFUR (2006); HUGO SLIM & ANDY BONWICK, PROTECTION – AN ALNAP GUIDE FOR 
HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES (2004); SORCHA O’CALLAGHAN & SARA  
PANTULIANO, PROTECTIVE ACTION: INCORPORATING CIVILIAN PROTECTION INTO  
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE (2007). 
 78. See THE SPHERE PROJECT, http://www.sphereproject.org (last visited Aug. 15, 
2013).  
 79. THE SPHERE PROJECT, HUMANITARIAN CHARTER AND MINIMUM STANDARDS 
IN DISASTER RESPONSE 5 (2000). 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. (emphasis added). 
 82. See id. at 20. See also THE SPHERE PROJECT, 2011 EDITION OF THE SPHERE 
HANDBOOK: WHAT IS NEW? 3 (2011) (explaining the reason for the change in emphasis:  
“The doctrine of state sovereignty means that, in practice, almost all intervention by these  
bodies is at the request of or at least with the consent of the government of the state in  
question. International non-governmental organizations (NGOs), for their part, have no  
formal rights or responsibilities in international law other than the right to offer  
assistance. The state has an obligation to provide humanitarian assistance – and if it  
cannot (or will not), it is obliged to allow others to do so. But ultimately, the basis for  
engagement by non-governmental agencies remains a moral rather than a legal one.”). 
 83. This will be discussed further in Chapter Three under the section on Positive 
extra-territorial obligations during complex emergencies.  




 It can refer to physical protection of beneficiaries, usually 
through cooperation with host country security forces or UN 
peacekeeping soldiers, to provide security inside camps and protect the 
recipients of humanitarian aid from attacks by third parties.
 85
 It is also 
used in relation to advocacy activity where humanitarian actors may 
“bear witness to” or “document and denounce” grave violations of 
human rights and IHL.
86
 
The last two uses of the term sometimes cause dilemmas for 
humanitarian agencies, as one may involve becoming too closely linked 
to military forces while the other could lead to an antagonistic 
  
 84. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 74; 
INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 74; GLOBAL PROTECTION CLUSTER 
WORKING GROUP, supra note 74; SWITHERN & HASTIE, supra note 74; SLIM & BONWICK, 
supra note 71. See also CARITAS AUSTRALIA ET AL., MINIMUM AGENCY STANDARDS FOR 
INCORPORATING PROTECTION INTO HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE (2008) (describing a project 
recently developed by a number of aid agencies which seeks to incorporate “protection 
standards” into evaluations of humanitarian programming).  
 85. See, e.g., Victoria Metcalfe, Protecting Civilians? The Interaction Between  
International Military and Humanitarian Actors (Humanitarian Policy Grp., Working  
Paper, 2012); Cedric De Coning, Walter Lotze, & Andreas Øien Stensland, Mission-Wide  
Strategies for the Protection of Civilians, A Comparison of MONUC, UNAMID and  
UNMIS (Norwegian Inst. of Int’l Affairs, Working Paper No. 792, 2011); Jane Barry &  
Anna Jefferys, A Bridge Too Far: Aid Agencies and the Military in Humanitarian  
Response (Humanitarian Practice Network, Working Paper No. 37, 2002); Hugo Slim,  
Military Intervention to Protect Human Rights: the Humanitarian Agency Perspective  
(The Int’l Council on Human Rights Policy, Working Paper, 2001); Danielle Coquoz,  
The Involvement of the Military in Humanitarian Activities, in THE CHALLENGES OF  
COMPLEMENTARITY: FOURTH WORKSHOP ON PROTECTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND  
HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2000);  
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PEACE-KEEPING AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1994). 
 86. Bearing witness to violations is closely associated with MSF which split from 
the ICRC during the Biafra crisis over the latter’s perceived reluctance to speak out 
publicly against violations of international human rights law and IHL committed by the 
Nigerian government. For a brief overview of the founding of MSF, see MSF USA 
Homepage ‘The founding of MSF’, available at  
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/about-us/history-principles/founding-msf (last  
visited Mar. 7 2015). For the ICRC’s view of events see David P. Forsythe, ‘The  
International Committee of the Red Cross and humanitarian assistance - A policy  
analysis’, International Review of the Red Cross, Oct. 1996, ICRC publication No. 314, 
512-31. 
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relationship with them. Aid agencies usually wish to maintain their 
neutrality in conflicts
87
 and often rely on the consent of the host state, 
and other parties to the conflict, in order to gain access to the victims. 
Both activities could potentially compromise this access. As one study 
noted, in relation to Darfur, “[a]dvocacy by operational aid actors is 
frequently juxtaposed with programming, with speaking out weighed 
against potential costs to programmes, staff and beneficiaries.”88  
This issue was also graphically highlighted by the experiences of the 
agencies working in Sri Lanka, in the spring of 2009, when government 
forces massacred between 40,000 and 70,000 people at the end of the 
country’s civil war.89 A UN appointed panel noted that the organization 
“did not adequately invoke principles of human rights that are the 
foundation of the UN but appeared instead to do what was necessary to 
avoid confrontation with the government.”90 Some UN agencies even 
cooperated in the construction of “closed camps” into which the 
survivors were herded for screening.
91
 Both UN and NGO aid workers 
  
 87. While most humanitarian agencies adhere to the principle of neutrality set out 
in the Geneva Conventions and the ICRC statute, some believe that adherence to it can be 
naive or even harmful. See Thomas Weiss, Principle, Politics and Humanitarian Action, 
13 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 1 (1999); Hugo Slim, Sharing a Universal Ethic: Principle, 
Politics and Humanitarian Action, 2 THE INT’L J. OF HUM. RTS. 28 (1998); Michael 
Ignatieff, International Committee of the Red Cross, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE 
PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW 203 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999); MARY ANDERSON, 
DO NO HARM: SUPPORTING LOCAL CAPACITIES FOR PEACE THROUGH AID (1996) 
(“Although aid agencies often seek to be neutral or non-partisan towards the winners and 
losers of a war, the impact of their aid is not neutral regarding whether conflict worsens 
or abates. The development of programming principles such as ‘Do No Harm’ or Local 
Capacities for Peace (LCP) are intended to ensure that humanitarian assistance should be 
provided in ways that contributes to ‘justice, peace and reconciliation.’”).  
 88. HUMANITARIAN POLICY GROUP, HUMANITARIAN ADVOCACY IN DARFUR: THE 
CHALLENGE OF NEUTRALITY (2007).  
 89. See U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General’s Panel of 
Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka (Mar. 31, 2011); INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, 
WAR CRIMES IN SRI LANKA (May 2010); Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields: War Crimes 
Unpunished (Channel 4 television broadcast Mar. 14, 2012).  
 90.  U.N. Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel, United Nations Action in 
Sri Lanka, ¶ (Nov. 2012), at 4. 
 91. Id. at 32 (“During the final months and then weeks of the conflict, civilians 
emerging from the conflict zone were severely malnourished, traumatized, exhausted, 
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argued that since speaking out would result in their expulsion from the 
country, the “humanitarian imperative” required them to remain and that 
‘quiet diplomacy’ could reinforce their “protection by presence.”92 An 
internal review of the performance of the UN’s performance in Sri Lanka 




Aid agencies are divided amongst themselves about how to respond to 
this “protection” dilemma. For example, CARE International has stated 
that: “Agency staff must know the basics of human rights law and IHL 
[international human rights law]. Staff must know who is protected, and 
the threats from which they are protected.”94 However, it is less clear 
what CARE believes staff should do when they see violations:  
Sometimes speaking out publicly is necessary. . . . The questions for an 
organization like CARE, however, is to establish thresholds for 
speaking out, since it will lead to obvious organizational and personal 
risks. Over time, we have gained some experience with establishing 
these thresholds (basically we feel obligated to speak out until such a 
  
and often seriously injured. The security forces, attempting to identify LTTE cadres, 
screened everyone and detained 280,000 people in military-run closed internment camps 
– which the Government referred to as ‘welfare villages.’ In the camps, IDPs were 
screened again and the military detained those suspected of LTTE affiliations in 
‘surrender’ camps. There were persistent allegations of human rights violations at the 
screening points and in IDP camps but the UN was not permitted fully independent 
protection monitoring access. The UNCT had used its  March 9 briefing and subsequent 
documents to inform the diplomatic corps of UN efforts to be present at screening 
locations, but did not mention the reports of people disappearing from other screening 
locations to which the UN had no access. UN officials said they were confronted with a 
dilemma over whether to hold back and insist on respect for principles or to provide 
urgently needed assistance through camps that were operating in violation of 
international standards. The UN chose to support the camps.”). 
 92. The author of this thesis was carrying out an evaluation of “protection 
projects” for a humanitarian aid organization in Sri Lanka in February, March and April 
2009 and these comments are based on interviews carried out with the senior staff of a 
number of UN and NGO humanitarian agencies working in the country at the time. 
 93. United Nations Action in Sri Lanka, supra note 90, ¶ 80. 
 94. Dan Maxwell, Humanitarian Protection: Recommendations Towards Good 
Practice for Non-Mandated Organizations, CARE, Apr. 2006. 
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time as a Country Director determines that speaking out will endanger 
staff or other program commitments).
95
  
The implication of this position, that an agency would stop 
denouncing violations once they reached a certain level of severity, was 
traditionally rejected by other organisations such as Medecins Sans 
Frontieres (MSF) whose former legal director has argued: 
Protecting means recognizing that individuals have rights and that the 
authorities who exercise power over them have obligations. It means 
defending the legal existence of individuals, alongside their physical 
existence. It means attaching the juridical link of responsibility to the 
chain of assistance measures that guarantee the survival of individuals . 
. . . When providing relief in times of conflict, humanitarian 
organizations therefore must not separate the provision of assistance 
from protection . . . and must report any violations encountered in the 
exercise of their work.
96
 
The views of humanitarian agencies also appear to be in some 
considerable flux about the issue. A paper published by the Humanitarian 
Policy Group (HPG) in 2011 argued that “it is generally accepted that 
protecting civilians in armed conflict and other situations of violence 
relates to violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, 
and is not limited to mere physical security but rather encompasses “the 
broader spectrum of human security and human dignity.”97 However, 
four years previously an HPG paper had stated that humanitarian 
agencies were seeking to develop: 
[M]ore accessible working definitions [of protection] which emphasise 
safety rather than rights. These working definitions distil a distinctive 
  
 95. Id. 
 96. FRANCOISE BOUCHET-SAULNIER, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 308 (2002).  
 97. HUMANITARIAN POLICY GRP., ROUNDTABLE ON CIVIL-MILITARY 
COORDINATION: THE CONCEPT OF PROTECTION: TOWARDS A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING 10 
(2011); Victoria Metcalfe, Protecting Civilians? The Interaction Between International 
Military and Humanitarian Actors 1 (Humanitarian Policy Group, Working Paper, 2012) 
(citing the conclusions of a round-table discussion).  
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humanitarian element from the all-encompassing ICRC definition, in 
that they focus on the more acute forms of suffering. Put simply, 




Still others are critical of the entire concept of “humanitarian 
protection.” In 2010, for example, Marc DuBois of MSF, questioned the 
“obsession with protection,” which, he argued has become a “sort of self-
flagellation in the humanitarian community over the death and 
destruction of our beneficiaries.”99 He maintained that claims by 
humanitarians that they can “develop truly practical programming that 
protects people from all forms of violation, exploitation, and abuse 
during war and disaster”100 amount to “delusions of grandeur” and “false 
advertising.” It is “not the lack of protection activities or legal 
protections in the first instance, but the surplus of violence that is the 
primary problem.” He concluded that “the protection of civilians during 
periods of violent crisis (in the sense of providing physical safety) is not 
our job.”101  
The ultra-elasticity of the “rights-based definition” has also 
sometimes been used by UN peacekeeping missions with POC mandates 
to define ‘protection’ as including their own activities in distributing 
humanitarian assistance, monitoring for violations of international human 
rights law and IHL, and liaison and advocacy with the national 
authorities.
 102
 However, this definition fails to provide clear legal 
guidance about the circumstances in which missions should use physical 
  
 98. PANTULIANO & O’CALLAGHAN, supra note 77, at 12. 
 99. Marc DuBois, Protection: Fig-Leaves and Other Delusions, HUMANITARIAN 
EXCH. MAGAZINE, Mar. 2010. 
 100. Id. (quoting HUGO SLIM & ANDY BONWICK, PROTECTION – AN ALNAP GUIDE 
FOR HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES 12 2004). 
 101. Id.  
 102. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/2001/331, (Mar. 30, 2001); U.N. Secretary-
General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict, S/2002/1300, (Nov. 26, 2002) (discussing the humanitarian rights-based concept 
of protection and failed to even mention the role of internationally-mandated forces in 
protecting civilians against violence). This issue will be discussed further in relation to 
specific missions in Chapter Six. 
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force to protect civilians or to address the negative and positive legal 
obligations that this places on missions and the UN itself. A similar 
ambiguity can be found in the R2P concept, which is described below. 
III. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
Advocates of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) doctrine commonly 
describe it as:  
[A]n emerging international norm which sets forth that states have the 
primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, but that when the 




In September 2005, a reference to R2P was incorporated into two 
paragraphs of the outcome document of the high-level meeting of the 
General Assembly (Outcome Document), which was subsequently 
adopted by the General Assembly.
104
 The UN Security Council has also 
reaffirmed these principles.
105
 In 2007 the Secretary General appointed a 
Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, based in the office of 
the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.
106
 R2P can, 
therefore, be said to have been endorsed at the UN’s highest decision-
making levels and to reflect a global consensus, at least in abstract, that 
  
 103. Frequently Asked Questions, RESPONSIBILITYTOPROTECT.ORG,  
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/R2Pcs%20Frequently%20Asked%20Questio
n.pdf. 
 104. G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc.  
A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).  
 105. Sec. Res. 1674, supra note 7, ¶ 4; see also S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. SCOR, 61st 
year, S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006).  
 106. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter Dated Aug. 31, 2007 From the Secretary-
General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2008/721 (Dec. 
7, 2007). The latter post was upgraded to the Under-Secretary-General level while the 
R2P advisor position was designated at the level of Assistant Secretary-General, on a 
part-time basis. Id. 
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people should be protected against such crimes.
107
 As the first Special 
Advisor on R2P has noted the concept has generated a “staggering” 
number of academic theses and the “ever-expanding literature on the 
responsibility to protect . . . could now fill a small library.”108 However, 
as will be discussed further below, there is considerable confusion about 
precisely what – if anything – it really means in practice.109  
The term was originally coined by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), established in the aftermath 
of NATO’s military action during the Kosovo crisis of 1999110 whose 
report was published in December 2001.
111
 NATO’s intervention had 
taken place without the explicit approval of the UN Security Council and 




 107. See generally GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING 
MASS ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL (2008); see generally THOMAS G. WEISS & 
RAMESH THAKUR, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE UN: AN UNFINISHED JOURNEY (Ind. 
University Press 2010); see generally RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACE 
AND SECURITY: FROM COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2006); 
see generally RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE GLOBAL MORAL COMPACT FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (Richard H. Cooper & Juliette Voïnov Kohler eds., 2009); see generally 
PROTECTING THE DISPLACED: DEEPENING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (Sara E. 
Davies & Luke Glanville eds., 2010); see generally RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: 
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH (Rama Mani & Thomas G. Weiss eds., 
2011). 
 108. Edward C. Luck, The Responsibility to Protect: Growing Pains or Early 
Promise?, 24 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 349, 349 (2010); see generally Edward C. Luck, 
Sovereignty, Choice, and the Responsibility to Protect, 1 Global Resp. to Protect 10 
(2009). 
 109. See, e.g., Aidan Hehir & Eric A. Heinze, The Responsibility to Protect: 
“Never Again!” for the 21st Century?, in Human Rights, Human Security, and State 
Security: The Intersection 1, 19 (Saul Takahashi ed., 2014). 
 110. See generally TIM JUDAH, KOSOVO: WAR AND REVENGE (2000); see generally 
NOEL MALCOLM, KOSOVO: A SHORT HISTORy (1998); see generally JULIE A. MERTUS, 
KOSOVO: HOW MYTHS AND TRUTHS STARTED A WAR (1999); see generally DAVID L. 
PHILLIPS, LIBERATING KOSOVO: COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AND US INTERVENTION (2012). 
 111. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, The  
Responsibility to Protect (2001) [hereinafter ICISS]. 
 112. See, e.g., CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 31, 
39-51, 351-54 (3rd ed. 2008); see, e.g., SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE?  
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 53-86 (2001); see, e.g., Mary  
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some argued that the scale of violations of international human rights law 
and IHL that were allegedly taking place in Kosovo immediately before 
the intervention provided at least mitigating circumstances for the 
action.
113
 As one report has argued the intervention was “illegal but 
legitimate.”114 
In his 1999 General Assembly report Kofi Annan, the then UN 
Secretary General, had famously questioned whether a hypothetical 
coalition of states should have “stood aside,” if they had not received 
“prompt Security Council authorization” to act in Rwanda to stop the 
genocide, but also warned of the danger of “military action outside the 
established mechanisms for enforcing international law.”115 Such 
interventions, he warned, could “undermin[e] the imperfect, yet resilient, 
security system created after the Second World War, and of setting 
dangerous precedents for future interventions without a clear criterion to 
decide who might invoke these precedents and in what circumstances.”116 
The following year he again posed the question that “if humanitarian 
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to Rwanda, to a Srebrenica?”117  
The ICISS was established, on an initiative by the Canadian 
government, with the expressed aim of fostering a global political 
  
Ellen O’Connell, The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 
57, 57 (2000). 
 113. See generally Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’ 
Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159 (2002); see 
generally Antonio Cassese, A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and 
Opinio Necessitatis, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 791 (1999); see generally Antonio Cassese, Ex 
iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Humanitarian Countermeasures 
in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23 (1999); see generally Bruno Simma, 
NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999). 
 114. INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO 
REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 4 (2000). 
 115. Press Release, Secretary General, Secretary-General Presents His Annual 
Report to General Assembly, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136 (Sept. 20, 1999). 
 116. Id.  
 117. U.N. Secretary-General, ‘We the Peoples’: The Role of the United Nations in 
the 21st Century, 48, U.N. A/54/2000 (2000). 
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consensus on the issue.
118
 Its original title had been the “‘Commission on 
Humanitarian Intervention’”, but this was changed due to concerns that 
the language would be seen as controversial.
119
 The report noted that the 
term “intervention” can cover a range of activities from the “delivery of 
emergency relief assistance to military action.”120 Its authors stated that 
“[t]he kind of intervention with which we are concerned in this report is 
action taken against a state or its leaders, without its or their consent, for 
purposes which are claimed to be humanitarian or protective.”121 The 
report recognized that interventions were often harmful, destabilizing 
states and “fanning ethnic or civil strife.”122 Nevertheless, it argued that:  
The notion that there is an emerging guiding principle in favour of 
military intervention for human protection purposes is also supported 
by a wide variety of legal sources – including sources that exist 
independently of any duties, responsibilities or authority that may be 
derived from Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These legal foundations 
include fundamental natural law principles; the human rights provisions 
of the UN Charter; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights together 
  
 118. For accounts of the negotiations that led to the wording adopted at the summi 
see ALEX J. BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE GLOBAL EFFORT TO END MASS 
ATROCITIES 66-97 (2009); see generally Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: An 
Idea Whose Time Has Come ... and Gone?, 22 INT’L REL. 283 (2008). 
 119. BELLAMY, supra note 118, at 35; see also ICISS, supra note 111, ¶¶ 1.39, 
1.40, 2.4 (The ICISS report recognized “the long history, and continuing wide and 
popular usage, of the phrase ‘humanitarian intervention,’ and also its descriptive 
usefulness in clearly focusing attention on one particular category of interventions.” 
However, its authors “made a deliberate decision not to adopt this terminology, preferring 
to refer either to ‘intervention,’ or as appropriate ‘military intervention,’ for human 
protection purposes.” This was partly due “to the very strong opposition expressed by 
humanitarian agencies, humanitarian organizations and humanitarian workers towards 
any militarization of the word ‘humanitarian’” and, more broadly, because they felt that it 
“did not help to carry the debate forward.”). 
 120. ICISS, supra note 111, ¶ 1.38. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. ¶ 4.12 (It also stated that “[t]he rule against intervention in internal affairs 
encourages states to solve their own internal problems” and that “[w]hen internal forces 
seeking to oppose a state believe that they can generate outside support by mounting 
campaigns of violence, the internal order of all states is potentially compromised.”). See 
also Id. ¶ 2.9 (describing forcible interventions during the Cold War). 
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with the Genocide Convention; the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols on international humanitarian law; the statute of 
the International Criminal Court; and a number of other international 
human rights and human protection agreements and covenants.
123
  
The report suggested that when the Security Council fails to act the 
“responsibility” may pass to the General Assembly124 or Regional 
Organisations, including occasions when the latter act outside their area 
of membership.
125
 As an interim measure it suggested that the Security 
Council’s permanent members adopt a voluntary code of conduct 
restricting the use of their veto power
126
 and “consider and seek to reach 
agreement on a set of guidelines, embracing the ‘Principles for Military 
Intervention’ . . . to govern their responses to claims for military 
intervention for human protection purposes.”127 
Three years after the publication of the ICISS report, in December 
2004, the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
report A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, endorsed R2P 
as an “emerging norm,” while specifying that the responsibility was 
  
 123. Id. ¶ 2.26; see also Id. ¶ 8.22 (It notes the “positive influence” of international 
non-governmental organizations (INGOs) as “advocates of cross-border human 
protection” and “stirring response – especially in the West” for military interventions.); 
Id. ¶ 4.29 (“Ideally there would be a report as to the gravity of the situation, and the 
inability or unwillingness of the state in question to manage it satisfactorily, from a 
universally respected and impartial non-government source. The International Committee 
for the Red Cross (ICRC) is an obvious candidate for this role, often mentioned to us, but 
for understandable reasons – based on the necessity for it to remain, and be seen to 
remain, absolutely removed from political decision making, and able to operate anywhere 
on the ground – it is absolutely unwilling to take on any such role.”). 
 124. Id. ¶¶ 6.29-6.30. 
 125. Id. ¶¶ 6.31-6.35.  
 126. Id. ¶ 6.21; Id. ¶ 6.20 (Noting that “[t]hose states who insist on the right to 
retaining permanent membership of the UN Security Council and the resulting veto 
power, are in a difficult position when they claim to be entitled to act outside the UN 
framework as a result of the Council being paralyzed by a veto cast by another permanent 
member.”). 
 127. Id. ¶ 8.29; Id. ¶ 8.30 (Stating “[t]hat the Secretary-General [should] give 
consideration, and consult as appropriate . . . as to how the substance and action 
recommendations of this report can best be advanced in those two bodies, and by his own 
further action.”). 
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‘exercisable by the Security Council . . . as a last resort, in the event of 
genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious 
violations of international humanitarian law.
128
 The following year, in 
March 2005, the UN Secretary-General’s report In Larger Freedom: 
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, used similar 
language.
129
 The Outcomes Document of the World Summit included 
two paragraphs referring to R2P.
130
 This included a commitment:  
  
 128. U.N. Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, A More Secured World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 203, U.N. Doc. A/59/5665 
(Dec. 2, 2004) (“We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international 
responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military 
intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic 
cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign 
Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.”). 
 129. U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security 
and Human Rights for All, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) (Annan stated, 
“While I am well aware of the sensitivities involved in this issue, I strongly agree with 
this approach. I believe that we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when 
necessary, we must act on it. This responsibility lies, first and foremost, with each 
individual State, whose primary raison d’être and duty is to protect its population. But if 
national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the 
responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and 
other methods to help protect the human rights and well-being of civilian populations. 
When such methods appear insufficient, the Security Council may out of necessity decide 
to take action under the Charter of the United Nations, including enforcement action, if so 
required.”). 
 130. 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶¶ 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1 (Sept. 15, 
2005) (“Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility 
entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and 
necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The 
international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise 
this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning 
capability. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in 
accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we 
are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-
case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their 
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to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter 
VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and 
national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
131
  
The significance of this commitment continues to be debated and a 
wide-range of views have been expressed on the subject.
132
 As Hehir and 
Heinze have caustically noted, “the pronouncements made about the 
novelty of R2P regarding both international law and international norms, 
  
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the 
Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and 
appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which 
are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.”). 
 131. Id. ¶ 139. 
 132. For generally supportive views see Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to 
Protect—Five Years On, 24 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 143 (2010); GARETH EVANS, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING MASS ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL 47 
(2008); RAMESH THAKUR, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: NORMS, LAWS AND THE USE 
OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (2011); RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS, 
PEACE AND SECURITY: FROM COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
(2006); THOMAS G. WEISS & RAMESH THAKUR, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE UN: AN 
UNFINISHED JOURNEY (2010); Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the 
Responsibility to Protect, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 703, 703-22 (2006); Gareth Evans, The 
Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come ... and Gone?, 22 INT’L REL. 
283, 288 (2008); Ramesh Chandra Thakur & Thomas G. Weiss, R2P: From Idea to 
Norm—and Action?, 1 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 22 (2009). For more critical accounts, 
see Simon Chesterman, ‘Leading from Behind’: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama 
Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention After Libya, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 279 
(2011). See also Carlo Focarelli, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and 
Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine, 13 J. 
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 191 (2008); Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political 
Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99 (2007); ANNE ORFORD, 
INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2011); Anne Orford, 
From Promise to Practice? The Legal Significance of the Responsibility to Protect 
Concept, 3 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 400, 401 (2011). 
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as well as its efficacy in solidifying a commitment by states to 
acknowledge that they have a bona fide ‘responsibility’ to protect, are 
overly sanguine and hyperbolic.”133  
This lack of clarity has led to a number of strikingly conflicting 
claims about R2P.
134
 For example, Stuenkel claims that the emerging 
powers of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS) 
have “supported R2P in the vast majority of cases,”135 although all are 
notably sceptical about UN authorised military interventions on 
humanitarian grounds.
136
 Conversely, government members of other 
permanent Security Council members have made references to R2P 
when seeking to justify actions which have little to do with the original 
concept.
137
 Its ambiguity is perhaps best summarized by Thomas Weiss, 
  
 133. Aidan Hehir and Eric A. Heinze, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: “Never 
Again!” for the  
21st Century?’, in HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN SECURITY, AND STATE SECURITY 19 (Saul 
Takahashi ed., 2004). 
 134. See, e.g., Press Release, General Assembly, Delegates Seek to End Global 
Paralysis in Face of Atrocities as General Assembly Holds Interactive Dialogue on 
Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Press Release GA/10847 (July 23, 2009) (statements by 
Gareth Evans, Edward Luck, Professor Noam Chomsky, and Professor Jean Bricmont). 
 135. Oliver Stuenkel, Abstract, The BRICS and the Future of R2P, 6 GLOBAL 
RESP. TO PROTECT 3 (2014). See also Kai Michael Kenkel, Brazil and R2P: Does Taking 
Responsibility Mean Using Force?, 4 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 5 (2012). Both make 
the point that Brazil bases its support for R2P on its agreement with the first two pillars, 
but differs with the “interventionists” over the use of force. 
 136. For example, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Germany all abstained from 
Security Council Resolution 1973, authorizing military intervention in Libya, while 
South Africa voted in favor of it; though, it subsequently expressed reservations about 
NATO’s military action. See EMILY O’BRIEN & RICHARD GOWAN, CENTER ON 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE IN LIBYA’S TRANSITION 15 
(2012), available at  
http://cic.es.its.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/libya_diplomatic_transition.pdf. In 2012, 
BRICS issued a joint statement calling for “respect [of] Syrian independence, territorial 
integrity and sovereignty.” BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS para. 21 (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/brazil/brics-summit-delhi-
declaration/p27805. 
 137. Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Speech at Labour’s Local Government, 
Women’s and Youth Conferences (2003); Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Speech to the U.S. 
Congress (2003); Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Prime Minister Warns of Continuing 
Global Terror Threat (2004) (referring to R2P in relation to the invasion of Iraq); 
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who served as the ICISS Research Director and is one of its leading 
academic proponents:  
the proverbial new bottom-line is clear: when a state is unable or 
unwilling to safeguard its own citizens and peaceful means fail, the 
resort to outside intervention, including military force (preferably with 
Security Council approval) remains a distinct possibility.
138
  
This vagueness, and the clearly controversial nature of some 
interpretations that have been put on it, are particularly problematic 
given the widespread confusion between R2P and POC. 
IV. R2P AND POC 
Both POC and R2P arose out of an initiative by the Canadian 
government when it occupied the Presidency of the Security Council in 
1999 and share the same overall goal of protecting civilians from grave 
violations of human rights and IHL.
139
 The first Security Council 
resolution to reaffirm the two paragraphs on R2P in the Summit 
Outcome document, in April 2006, was devoted to POC
140
 and a 
  
Interview by Minister of Foreign Affaires of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov with 
BBC, in Moscow, Russ. (Aug. 9, 2008) (using R2P to justify military action in South 
Ossetia); Foreign Minister, Burma – Joint Communiqué Issued by the Ministry of 
Foreign and European Affairs and Ministry of Defence, in Paris, France (May 25, 2008) 
(citing R2P in relation to a proposed forcible intervention to deliver food aid in 
Myanmar); John Reid, Secretary of State for Defense, 20th-Century Rules, 21st-Century 
Conflict (Apr. 3, 2006). See also John Reid, I Do Not Reject the Geneva Conventions, 
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2006),  
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/apr/05/comment.politics (stating that 
his claim—that the protections which the Geneva Conventions provide to inmates at 
Guantanamo Bay should be reconsidered—is supported). 
 138. THOMAS G. WEISS, WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE UNITED NATIONS AND HOW TO 
FIX IT 142 (2008). 
 139. For discussion see Raphael van Steenberghe, The Notions of the 
Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts: Detecting 
Their Association and its Impact Upon International Law, 6 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 81 
(2014). 
 140. S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006). 
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resolution a few months later on the situation in Darfur also contained 
references to both POC and R2P.
141
  
A number of states have made declarations associating the two 
concepts together and the Secretary General’s report on POC in 2007 
contains a reference to the Summit Outcome document as an advance in 
POC’s “normative framework.”142 A POC strategy document published 
by the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and 
the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
expressly refers to R2P in three paragraphs under a section entitled 
“Rationale and the Responsibility to Protect.”143  
However, in his 2012 report on POC the Secretary General stated that 
he was “concerned about the continuing and inaccurate conflation of the 
concepts of the protection of civilians and the responsibility to protect,” 
and that while “the two concepts share some common elements” there 
were also “fundamental differences” between them as POC “is a legal 
concept based on international humanitarian, human rights and refugee 
law, while the responsibility to protect is a political concept.”144 In his 
report on R2P he also noted that, “While the work of peacekeepers may 
contribute to the achievement of RtoP goals, the two concepts of the 
responsibility to protect and the protection of civilians have separate and 
distinct prerequisites and objectives.”145  
As Steenberghe has noted the references to R2P in some resolutions 
dealing with POC has been deliberately pushed by some NGOs “with the 
explicit hope of transforming R2P from an emerging norm into 
  
 141. S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006). 
 142. U.N. Secretary-General, The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, ¶¶ 11-
12, U.N. Doc. S/2007/643 (Oct. 28, 2007). 
 143. UN System-Wide Strategy for the Protection of Civilians in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (Jan. 2010), available at  
http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Democratic
_Republic_Congo/files/UN_Wide_Protection_Strategy_Final_150110_EN.pdf. 
 144. U.N. Secretary-General, The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, ¶ 21, 
U.N. Doc. S/2012/376 (May 22, 2012). 
 145. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive 
Response, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/66/874-S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012). 
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established customary international law.”146 This has led some countries 
to complain that the two concepts must not be “confused or conflated,” 
since this could undermines POC’s accepted neutral “humanitarian 
imperative.”147 A briefing from the Global Centre for the Responsibility 
to Protect, in 2009, explained: 
Open debates on POC have indeed been the only occasions within the 
formal [Security] Council agenda to reflect on the development of the 
R2P norm and its practice. Yet the sensitivities around the inclusion of 
R2P within the protection of civilians’ agenda have increased in recent 
months. There are concerns that the POC agenda is being needlessly 
politicized by the introduction of R2P into the Council’s work and 
resolutions on the protection of civilians, as those who seek to roll back 
the 2005 endorsement of R2P raise questions about the protection of 




Holt and Berkman have warned that debates about R2P could 
“distract the international community from addressing the practical, 
immediate challenges within current operations.”149 Willmot and 
  
 146. Steenberghe, supra note 139, at 105. “Numerous letters have been sent by 
NGOs to States, before UN SC meetings on POC, in order to push those States to refer to 
R2P in their declarations during the meeting and in the resolution adopted at this 
occasion.” Id. at 112-13. 
 147. U.N. SCOR, 6531st mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6531 (May 10, 2011) (“The 
protection of civilians is a humanitarian imperative. It is a distinct concept [which] must 
not be confused or conflated with threats to international peace and security, as described 
in the Charter, or with the responsibility to protect.”). 
 148. See The Relationship between the Responsibility to Protect and the 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, GLOBAL CENTRE FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 




 149. Victoria K. Holt & Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military 
Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations, THE HENRY 
L. STIMSON CENTER 180 (Sept. 2006), available at  
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Complete_Document-
TheImpossible_Mandate-Holt_Berkman.pdf. 
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Mamiya argue that that, “While the international community struggled 
with the revolutionary strategic concepts of humanitarian intervention 
and the Responsibility to Protect, a quiet evolution was taking place 
through UN peacekeeping’, through the development of POC.”150 
Steenberghe has noted that the attempts to export R2P language into 
POC risks politicizing a “field characterized by neutrality and 
impartiality.”151 To which it can be added that the vagueness and 
differing interpretations of R2Ps actual meaning make it even more 
difficult to turn POC into an effective working doctrine when the two 
concepts are associated together. 
V. RESPONSIBILITY WHILE PROTECTING 
The distinctions between R2P and POC were further blurred by the 
UN Security Council authorization when it adopted two Chapter VII 
resolutions on the crisis in Libya in early 2011.
152
  
The first of these, in February, “[d]eplor[ed] the gross and systematic 
violation of human rights, including the repression of peaceful 
demonstrators . . . and reject[ed] unequivocally the incitement to hostility 
and violence against the civilian population made from the highest level 
of the Libyan government.”153 It urged Libya to “respect human rights 
and international humanitarian law” as well as ensuring “the safe passage 
of humanitarian and medical supplies, and humanitarian agencies and 
workers, into the country.”154 The resolution recalled that it was “the 
Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population” and 
  
 150. Haidi Willmot & Ralph Mamiya, Mandated to Protect: Security Council 
Practice on the Protection of Civilians, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF 
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Marc Weller ed., 2014). 
 151. Raphael van Steenberghe, The Notions of the Responsibility to Protect and 
the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts: Detecting Their Association and its 
Impact on International Law, 6 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 81, 106-07 (2014). 
 152. See generally EMILY O’BRIEN & RICHARD GOWAN, CENTER ON  
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE IN LIBYA’S TRANSITION (2012), 
available at http://cic.es.its.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/libya_diplomatic_transition.pdf 
(discussing the international response to this crisis). 
 153. S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
 154. Id.  
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reaffirmed its “strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, 
territorial integrity and national unity” of the country.155 Nevertheless, 
the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
imposed an arms embargo on the country and subjected key members of 
the Libyan government to a travel ban and an asset freeze.
156
 The 




On March 17 the Security Council adopted another resolution, 
restating many of these provisions and deploring the failure of the 
Libyan authorities to comply with them.
158
 It also authorized:  
Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting 
nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and 
acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary 
measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under 
threat of attack . . . while excluding a foreign occupation force of any 
form on any part of Libyan territory.
159
  
Two days later NATO began a massive bombardment of Libyan air 
defenses and military hardware, with a focus just outside the rebel-held 
town of Benghazi, which was besieged by government forces.
160
 
NATO’s campaign was to continue until the end of October when 





 155. Id.  
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. 
 158. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
 159. Id. ¶ 4. 
 160. CONOR FOLEY, HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES 1, 
available at http://www.atha.se/content/humanitarian-action-complex-emergencies- 
managing-linkages-security-agendas.  
 161. Id. Gaddafi’s death on October 20, 2011 was captured on mobile phone 
videos which circulated widely on the internet. These “[v]ideos taken on mobile phones 
show them beating Gaddafi and manhandling him on the back of a utility vehicle. He 
pleads with his captors, saying, ‘What are you doing? It’s not allowed in Islamic law . . . .  
Do you know what is right or wrong?’ The men scream, ‘Muammar, you dog!’ as blood 
pours from various parts of his body. One video then shows him being sodomized with 
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While the conflict was still ongoing Britain’s Prime Minister stated 
that his government’s understanding of the UN resolution was that it was 
“limited in its scope...[i]t explicitly does not provide legal authority for 
action to bring about Gaddafi’s removal from power by military 
means.”162 “NATO’s senior military planners have also subsequently 
stated that their rules of engagement (RoE) throughout the campaign 
were only to hit military targets and only if these had been identified as a 
specific threat to civilians at the time.”163 This was a significantly 
narrower RoE than those used by NATO during its campaign over 
Kosovo which deliberately targeted Serbian civilian infrastructure and 
also killed considerably more civilians.
164
 Nevertheless, the fact that the 
campaign continued until Gaddafi had been militarily deposed and the 
refusal of NATO to consider a ceasefire or facilitate negotiations which 
could conceivably have led to a peaceful power change of power led 
  
some kind of stick or knife. A gun is placed against his head and he is thrown onto a car, 
then dragged along the ground by his hair. Shots ring out, hidden from the camera, and 
his lifeless and badly scarred body is subsequently shown lying on the ground.” 
 162. Libya: Removing Gaddafi Not Allowed, Says David Cameron, BBC NEWS, 
Mar. 21, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12802749. 
 163. Conor Foley, To Save Succeeding Generations: UN Security Council Reform 
and the Protection of Civilians, IGARAPÉ INST., Aug. 2013, at 27, available at 
http://pt.igarape.org.br/to-save-succeeding-generations-un-security-council-reform-and-
the-protection-of-civilians/. This is based on an interview with General Rob Weighill 
who was director of operations during NATO’s operation. 
 164. See also C. J. Chivers, In Strikes on Libya by NATO, an Unspoken Civilian 
Toll, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2011),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/world/africa/scores-of-unintended-casualties-in-
nato-war-in-libya.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (According to NATO the air campaign 
had resulted in zero civilian casualties, “[b]ut an on-the-ground examination by The 
New York Times of airstrike sites across Libya — including interviews with survivors, 
doctors and witnesses, and the collection of munitions remnants, medical reports, death 
certificates and photographs — found credible accounts of dozens of civilians killed by 
NATO in many distinct attacks. The victims, including at least 29 women or children, 
often had been asleep in homes when the ordnance hit.” By contrast a Human Rights 
Watch investigation into the number of civilians killed by NATO during its air campaign 
over Kosovo killed between 489 and 520 civilians.); see Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air 
Campaign, 12 HUM. RTS. WATCH 1, 15 (2000). 
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Less than two weeks after the Security Council authorized the use of 
force to protect civilians in Libya, it adopted a resolution in relation to 
Côte d’Ivoire, which imposed targeted sanctions on the incumbent 
President, Laurent Gbagbo, and some of his close associates, and 
reinforced the authorisation of the UN mission to use force to protect 
civilians.
166
 Acting under this mandate, the UN mission launched 
operation “Protect the Civilian Population,” using attack helicopters to 
destroy the government’s heavy weapons in the capital city.167 Gbagbo 
was captured in the presidential palace by opposition forces, backed by 
French tanks, and brought into custody,
168
 where he was subsequently 
transferred to The Hague to stand trial at the International Criminal Court 
on charges of crimes against humanity.
169
  
In November 2011 the Brazilian government, which had been on the 
Security Council during both operations,
 
published a paper entitled 
“‘Responsibility while protecting: elements for the development and 
promotion of a concept’” (RwP).170 This noted that: 
The 1990s left us with a bitter reminder of the tragic human and 
political cost of the international community’s failure to act in a timely 
  
 165. See Foley, supra note 163. 
 166. See S.C. Res. 1975, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1975 (Mar. 30, 2011). 
 167. Press Release, UNOCI, UNOCI Calls on Gbagbo’s Special Forces to Lay 
Down Their Arms (Apr. 5, 2011); Press Release, UNOCI, UNOCI Launches Operation 
“Protect the Civilian Population” (Apr. 5, 2011); Press Release, UNOCI, UNOCI 
Transports Passengers Blocked in Abidjan (Apr. 5, 2011); Press Release, UNOCI, Pro-
Gbagbo Forces Ready to End Combat (Apr. 5, 2011); Press Release, UNOCI, UN 
Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Visits Côte d’Ivoire’ (Apr. 4, 2011). 
 168. Adam Nossiter, Scott Sayare & Dan Bilefsky, Leader’s Arrest in Ivory Coast 
Ends Standoff, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2011),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/world/africa/12ivory.html?pagewanted=all. 
 169. Stephanie Maupas & Jean-Philippe Remy, Laurent Gbago Appears at the 
Hague to Face Trial, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 6, 2011), available at  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/06/laurent-gbagbo-trial-the-hague. 
 170. U.N. S.C., transmitted by letter dated Nov. 9, 2011 from the Permanent 
Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. 
Doc. A/66/551-S/2011/701 (Nov. 11, 2011). 
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manner to prevent violence on the scale of that observed in Rwanda. 
There may be situations in which the international community might 
contemplate military action to prevent humanitarian catastrophes. Yet 
attention must also be paid to the fact that the world today suffers the 
painful consequences of interventions that have aggravated existing 
conflicts, allowed terrorism to penetrate into places where it previously 
did not exist, given rise to new cycles of violence and increased the 
vulnerability of civilian populations. There is a growing perception that 
the concept of the responsibility to protect might be misused for 
purposes other than protecting civilians, such as regime change.
171
  
The paper stressed that the specific wording on R2P incorporated into 
the 2005 World Summit Outcome document had been the result “of long 
and intense negotiations,” and that military force should only be 
authorised in “exceptional circumstances” where all other measures had 
“manifestly failed.”172 It stated that this authorization:  
must be limited in its legal, operational and temporal elements and the 
scope of military action must abide by the letter and the spirit of the 
mandate conferred by the Security Council or the General Assembly, 
and be carried out in strict conformity with international law, in 




Further, “the Security Council must ensure the accountability of those 
to whom authority is granted to resort to force.” 174  
RWP received a fairly mixed reaction. It has not been endorsed by the 
BRICS - some of whom regard it “as making too many concessions to 
the original R2P concept.”175 Some R2P supporters regarded it as an 
  
 171. Id. ¶¶ 8-10. 
 172. Id. ¶¶ 3, 4. 
 173. Id. ¶ 11(d). 
 174. Id. ¶ 11(i). 
 175. This comment is based on a discussion at an invitation-only seminar, 
organized by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, in Bahia in April 2013. The seminar was 
attended by Brazil’s foreign Minister and senior diplomatic corps along with the UN 
Ambassadors of India, Germany, Japan, South Africa and Sierra Leone. The discussion 
was conducted under Chatham House rules.  
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attempt to “undermine” the original concept,176 although others see the 
two as complementary.
177
 One particular criticism has been that by 
insisting on Security Council accountability over the use of force RWP 
concept would lead to the micro-management of interventions.
178
 
However, as will be discussed further in subsequent chapters, this is in 
fact how UN peacekeeping missions with POC mandates are managed. 
In July 2012 the UN Secretary General published his fourth paper on 
the progress made since the 2005 World Summit in implementing the 
responsibility to protect.
179
 This noted that “in recent years the 
responsibility to protect has been invoked in more situations than ever 
before. . . . With expanded use has come a deeper and wider conversation 
about how to ‘operationalize’ the responsibility to protect in a manner 
that is responsible, sustainable and effective.” “In that context, the 
  
 176. Thomas Wright, Brazil Hosts Workshop on “Responsibility While  
Protecting”, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 29, 2012),  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/29/brazil-hosts-workshop-on-responsibility-
while-protecting/. He concluded that Brazil’s main motivation for proposing the concept 
was that its officials had felt “personal[ly] humiliate[ed]” by their treatment on the 
Security Council by the US, Britain and France during the Libya crisis. Id. He argued that 
“giving the UNSC operational control over a military intervention would place troops at 
great risk and make failure more likely” and charged that “RWP would undermine R2P, 
not strengthen it; . . . that in practice RWP could result in greater harm to civilians 
because it incentivizes such behavior by the adversary; and that it does not offer answers 
to the very real dilemmas of R2P operations or explain what other alternatives might have 
been possible in R2P cases.” Id. 
 177. Gareth Evans, Responsibility While Protecting, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Jan. 27, 
2012), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/responsibility-while-protecting. He 
also criticized the sneering reaction towards RWP of some western diplomats. Id. 
 178. H.J., Our Friends in the South, ECONOMIST (Apr. 7, 2012),  
http://www.economist.com/blogs/ 
Democracyinamerica/2012/04/dilmar-rousseffs-visit-america (“Mr Obama will surely 
want to know, too, what exactly Brazil means by its big new foreign-policy idea. That is 
to complement the UN’s justification for intervention in another country’s affairs under 
the rubric ‘Responsibility to Protect’ with ‘Responsibility while Protecting’ after it has 
gone in. Since Brazil tends not to support going in in the first place, when would it want 
to see this new responsibility kick in? Even some experienced and sympathetic 
diplomatic observers in Brasília say they have no idea what concrete difference this 
would make on the ground.”). 
 179. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive 
Response, U.N. DOC. A/66/874–S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012). 
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initiative on ‘responsibility while protecting’ that was introduced by the 
President of Brazil during the general debate in September 2011 is 
welcome.”180 The report reviewed the debate about the intervention in 
Libya without offering any conclusions beyond observing that 
“[d]ecisions to use force or apply other coercive measure are never to be 
taken lightly and may involve ‘difficult choices.’”181 It concluded that 
there was a need for greater dialogue on this issue with the General 
Assembly since while there was wide acceptance that the “fundamental 
principles of international law” should be drawn upon to prevent and 
respond to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity, controversy still persisted on “aspects of implementation, in 
particular with respect to the use of coercive measures to protect 
populations.”182  
VI. ‘HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS’ AND THE UNILATERAL USE OF 
FORCE 
As discussed above, NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 
led to the establishment of an international commission whose report, 
published in December 2001, coined the term R2P.
183
 A few months 
before this, the attacks on 11th September 2001, led the US 
administration under President Bush, to declare a so-called “war on 
terror.”184 Forcible actions taken in response to these terrorist attacks 
have included the invasion of Iraq in 2003, as well as targeted 
assassinations of suspected terrorists in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen and 
elsewhere, cross-border pursuits, extraterritorial law enforcement, 
  
 180. Id. ¶ 50. 
 181. Id. ¶¶ 57-58. 
 182. Id. ¶ 59. 
 183. ICISS, supra note 111. 
 184. For the initial international response to these attacks see S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2011); see also S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 
(Sept. 28, 2011); Press Release, N. Atl. Treaty Org., Statement by the N. Atl. Council 
(Sept. 12, 2001); Press Release, Org. of Am. States, Rio Treaty Countries Lend Full 
Support to U.S. (Oct. 16, 2001) (showing an increasing acceptance that this type of force 
may be justified in certain circumstances). 
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extraordinary renditions, detentions without trial and the use of torture.
185
 
These actions provide some of the contextual background about the 
controversies surrounding R2P. As one prominent R2P supporter has 
noted it was the “spectacular misuse of R2P principles by the US-led 
coalition, supported particularly in this respect by the UK, in the case of 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq” that caused many states to conclude “that R2P 
will be just another excuse for neo-colonialist and neo-imperialist 
interventions.”186 
There is no standard definition for the term “humanitarian 
intervention,” although many associate it with apologias for nineteenth 
century imperialism by writers such as John Stewart Mill.
187
 However, 
the revelations about the Holocaust made some legal scholars urge a 
reconsideration of the doctrine, to permit interventions to protect basic 
human rights.
188
 In the sixth edition of Oppenheim’s International Law, 
published in 1947, for example, Lauterpacht argued that:  
There is general agreement that, by virtue of its personal and territorial 
supremacy, a State can treat its own nationals according to discretion. 
But there is a substantial body of opinion and of practice in support of 
  
 185. NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE 
ACTORS 25-63, 85-131 (2010); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF 
FORCE 30-65, 114-52, 327-426 (3d ed. 2008); HELEN DUFFY, THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND 
THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 151-61 (2005). 
 186. Gareth Evans, President, Int’l Crisis Grp., Keynote Address, at Harvard 
University Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Conference on Democracy in 
Contemporary Global Politics, Talloires, France (June 16, 2007). 
 187. John Stuart Mill, A Few Words on Non-Intervention, in ESSAYS ON 
EQUALITY, LAW, AND EDUCATION 109 (John M. Robson ed., 1984); Hugo Grotius 
‘Comentarius in Theses XI’: An Early Treatise on Sovereignty, the Just War and the 
Legitimacy of the Dutch Revolt, (Commentary Peter Borschenberg), Berne: New York, 
P. Lang, 199; T M C Asser Instituut (Ed) International Law and the Groatian Heritage, 
1983 for the origins of ‘just war’ theory.  
 188. For some contemporary polemical arguments in favor of “humanitarian 
interventions” see, e.g., NORMAN GERAS, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: BIRTH OF A 
CONCEPT (2011); see also GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE (1999); see also JAMES TRAUB, THE FREEDOM AGENDA: 
WHY AMERICA MUST SPREAD DEMOCRACY (JUST NOT THE WAY GEORGE BUSH DID) 
(2008); see also FRANCIS KOFI ABIEW, THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE 
OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (1999). 
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the view that there are limits to that discretion . . . when a State renders 
itself guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its nationals, in such 
a way as to deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the 




This argument was and remains controversial. Although the 
framework of international law developed since 1945 does provide more 
protection for individuals, this has been balanced by the development of 
three countervailing principles. The first of these is the strengthening of 
people’s right to self-determination.190 The second is the restrictions on 
outside interference in what are properly a country’s internal affairs.191 
The third is a reaffirmation of the legal prohibition on the unilateral 
threat or use of force and the crime of aggression.
192
 The non-
intervention norm is often justified on three main grounds: the 
  
 189. Hersch Lauterpacht, Oppenheim’s International Law, London: Longmans, 
Green & Co, 1947, p.96. 
 190. The twin International Covenants on Civil and Political and Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights both place the right to “self-determination” as the first Article in their 
list of human rights. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), UN GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, UN Doc. A/6316, at 52 (Mar. 23, 
1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.  
2200A (XXI), UN GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, UN Doc. A/6316 at 49 (Jan. 3, 
1976). 
 191. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has held 
that both the principles of non-intervention and the prohibition on the use of force are a 
part of customary international law, and that the prohibition of use of force may also be 
jus cogens. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 172-200 (June 27); Armed Activities on the Territory of 
the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), judgment, 2005 I.C.J 168, ¶ 148 (Dec. 19). 
 192. U.N. Charter art. 2; The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Judgment 
(Int’l Military Trib. for Nuremberg Oct. 1, 1946); Proceedings of the International  
Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, vol. 22 at 25 (Int’l Military Trib. for 
Nuremberg Aug. 27, 1946) (stating that initiating a war of aggression “is not only an 
international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war 
crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”); see also 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90; The Crime of Aggression, Resolution RC/Res.6, I.C.C. Doc. RC/Res.6, Annex I, 
Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International, Criminal Court on the crime of 
aggression, Article 8 bis, Crime of aggression, 1 (June 11, 2010). 
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“Westphalian” emphasis on reducing conflict amongst major states, the 
“liberal” emphasis on allowing each society to solve its own problems 




Some legal scholars argue that there is an emerging norm under 
customary international law, which permits such interventions when 
basic rights are being violated on a widespread or systematic scale.
194
 
However, apart from Britain, only Belgium
195
 has argued for the norm’s 
existence, which scarcely gives it either the opinio juris or repeated state 
practice required.
196
 Some scholars cite India’s intervention in 
Bangladesh in 1971, Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda in 1979 and 
Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia as “humanitarian” because they 
ousted despotic regimes.
197
 However, as Gray has noted, none of the 
  
 193. See J Bryan Hehir, Military Intervention and National Sovereignty: Recasting 
the Relationship, in HARD CHOICES: MORAL DILEMMAS IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
40 (Jonathan Moore ed., 1998); see also FRANCIS KOFI ABIEW, THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (1999); DAVID CHANDLER, 
FROM KOSOVO TO KABUL AND BEYOND: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
INTERVENTION (2d ed. 2006); ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2011). 
 194. Antonio Cassese, A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and 
Opinio Necessitatis, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 791, 791-99 (1999); see also Antonio Cassese, Ex 
iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible 
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 23-30 
(1999); Cassese, International Law, p. 321; Daniel Wolf, Humanitarian Intervention, in 
MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES 333, 358-59 (1988); GEOFFREY 
ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 470-77 
(3d ed., 2006); see generally HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND 
POLITICAL DILEMMAS (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003). 
 195. Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J. 1, 12 (June 2). 
 196.  See Legal Information Institute, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/customary_international_law (last visited Nov. 14, 
2014) (defining “customary international law” as law that “results from a general and 
consistent practice of states that they follow from a sense of legal obligation.”). 
 197. For example, Richard Lillich, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: A reply to Dr. 
Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives’, in: Moore (ed.), Law and civil war in 
the modern world, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974, p. 238; Warbrick, 
Colin and Lowe, Vaughan (eds), The United Nations and the Principles of International 
Law: essays in memory of Michael Akehurst, Routledge, London and New York, 1994; 
Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and 
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intervening states actually cited “humanitarian intervention” as the basis 
for their use of force and so the case seems to rest on the opinion that 
they “should have or could have used this justification.”198 Governments 
themselves have changed their own views on the subject.
 199
 For 
example, in the 1980s, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) comprehensively rejected the concept, arguing that:
 
 
The state practice to which advocates of the right of humanitarian 
intervention have appealed provides an uncertain basis on which to rest 
such a right. Not least this is because history has shown that 
humanitarian ends are almost always mixed with less laudable motives 
. . . . the best case that can be made in support of humanitarian 
intervention is that it cannot be said to be unambiguously illegal. To 
make that case, it is necessary to demonstrate, in particular by reference 
to Article 1(3) of the UN Charter, which includes the promotion and 
encouragement of respect for human rights as one of the Purposes of 
the United Nations, that paragraphs 7 and 4 of Article 2 do not apply in 
cases of flagrant violations of human rights. But the overwhelming 
majority of contemporary legal opinion comes down against . . . [it] for 
three main reasons: first, the UN Charter and the corpus of modern 
international law do not seem specifically to incorporate such a right; 
secondly, state practice in the past two centuries, and especially since 
1945, at best provides only a handful of genuine cases of humanitarian 
intervention, and, on most assessments, none at all; and finally, on 
prudential grounds, that the scope for abusing such a right argues 




International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Sean Murphy, Humanitarian 
Intervention, The United Nations in an Evolving World Order, Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1996. 
 198. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 34 (3d ed.  
2008) (emphasis in original). 
 199. See generally SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE?:  
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001); SEAN D. MURPHY, 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 
(1996). 
 200. FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENT NO. 148  
(1986), as reprinted in United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1986, 57 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 487, 618-19. 
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In 1992, however, the FCO’s legal counsellor told the Foreign Affairs 
Committee that Operation Provide Comfort, undertaken in Northern Iraq, 
while “not specifically mandated” by the Security Council had been 
taken by states “in exercise of the customary international law principle 
of humanitarian intervention.”201 By 1998 the British government was 
arguing that while “[t]here is no general doctrine of humanitarian 
necessity in international law” there were some cases when “in the light 
of all the circumstances, a limited use of force was justifiable in support 
of purposes laid down by the Security Council but without the council’s 
express authorisation.” 202 It cited the intervention in Northern Iraq in 
1991 as one such case – where the intervention had been “the only means 
to avert an immediate and overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe” and 
stressed that these cases would be “in the nature of things be 
exceptional” and “depend on an objective assessment of the factual 
circumstances at the time and on the terms of the relevant decisions of 
the Security Council bearing on the situation in question.”203  
In 2003 Britain’s Attorney General stated in private advice to the then 
prime minister, Tony Blair, that the three legal grounds for the use of 
force were “a) self-defence (which may include collective self-defence); 
b) exceptionally to avert overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe; and c) 
authorisation by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter.”204 His advice was that the situation in Iraq at the time did 
not constitute a basis for a ‘humanitarian intervention’ and advised first 
of all attempts to obtain a specific resolution authorising the invasion and 
then an interpretation of the existing resolutions so that they might be 
used to provide such a legal basis.
205
 After the invasion of Iraq Blair 
argued that the definition of a “humanitarian intervention” should be 
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expanded to include these type of regime-change invasions.
206
 In August 
2013 the British government published legal advice stating that it would 
be lawful to take military action, without Security Council authorization, 
in response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria and the alleged use of 
chemical weapons by its government.
207
  
As previously discussed, R2P supporters have gone to considerable 
lengths to persuade states to include references to R2P in their 
declarations at the UN and in the resolutions adopted by the Security 
Council and General Assembly in order to try and develop R2P as a 
customary norm of international law through opinio juris and state 
practice.
208
 However, they have consciously distanced the concept from 
its original association with ‘humanitarian intervention’ and the 
unilateral use of force without Security Council authorisation. During the 
civil war and humanitarian crisis in Syria in 2013 and 2014, for example, 
the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, an NGO 
coalition group, stated that:  
The Responsibility to Protect norm, as agreed to in the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document, does not sanction a 
unilateral military response or a response by a “coalition of the 





 206. Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Speech on the Terror Threat Facing the UK and 
Defending the Iraq War (Mar. 5, 2004) (“[A] regime can systematically brutalise and 
oppress its people and there is nothing anyone can do, when dialogue, diplomacy and 
even sanctions fail, unless it comes within the definition of a humanitarian catastrophe 
(though the 300,000 remains in mass graves already found in Iraq might be thought by 
some to be something of a catastrophe). This may be the law, but should it be?”). 
 207. PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE, 10 DOWNING STREET, CHEMICAL WEAPON USE BY 




 208. See Raphaël van Steenberghe, The Notions of the Responsibility to Protect 
and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Detecting Their Association and Its 
Impact Upon International Law, 6 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 81, 104-12 (2014). 
 209. The Crisis in Syria, INT’L COAL. FOR RESP. TO PROTECT,  
 
750 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 23.3 
 
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, another NGO, 
published a paper in the aftermath of the Libya crisis, clearly 
distinguishing R2P from “humanitarian interventions” and criticizing 
NATO members for going beyond - and breaching – the terms of UN 
Security Council resolution 1973 by promoting regime-change in 
Libya.
210
 Even the British government, a supporter of both R2P and 
“humanitarian interventions,” notes that while the two concepts share the 
same origin they have developed quite distinctively. It states that R2P:  
was in many ways a response to what its framers saw as the failures of 
the Security Council over its reaction to the genocide in Rwanda in 
1994 (where it acted too late), and to the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo 
in 1999 (where it did not authorise an intervention). The adoption of the 
responsibility to protect was therefore an attempt to move debate away 
from a focus solely on external military intervention by emphasising 
the responsibility of States towards their own populations, but also to 
signal the UN membership’s support for the idea that, if necessary, the 
Security Council can and should act in the face of genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity; the expectation 
being that this political commitment would make Security Council 
action more likely and less controversial in future.
211
 
As one scholar has commented, “saying the phrase ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ in a room full of philosophers, legal scholars and political 
scientists is a bit like crying ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre,”212 while another 
notes that “the only certainty within [the debate] is that as of yet it 
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remains unsettled.”.213 However, the wording of the UN Charter and the 
ICJ’s case law means that the balance of opinion is firmly against 
allowing individual states to act as judge, jury and executioner in 
deciding when such “humanitarian interventions” are permissible.214 
Ironically, the rise of R2P may have contributed to its demise. 
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